provisions designed to check the national government, then engrafted on. In general, the raison d'etre of constitutions is to create power, albeit power that is checked and channeled appropriately.
That means creating the institutions, structures, organizations, and legal framework that enable democratic government (at least in constitutional democracies). And in any modern state, one of the most essential elements in democratic self-government is the political party.
Although the romantic vision of the individual citizen as the vehicle of democratic selfgovernance still has powerful emotional and symbolic resonance, the reality is that in any large state, the most enduring and powerful vehicle for organizing citizens into effective participants in politics is the political party. Parties are central to defining political agendas, organizing coalitions of voters, amplifying the voices of diffuse groups, and keeping officeholders accountable. In recognition of this fact, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), has described the post-WW II German Constitution as having created a "party state"; the meaning of this idea is that democracy is only secured and made meaningful to the extent that free and vibrant political parties are permitted to compete for political power. But political parties in control of the powers of government can also use that power to seek to entrench themselves and reduce competitive pressures from other parties. Thus, constitutional regimes must both protect the role of political parties in democratic processes and protect democracy from partisan attempts to manipulate the rules of political engagement. This chapter explores how constitutional texts and court decisions have engaged the now wellrecognized centrality of political parties to making democratic self-government meaningful.
II. Constitutional Texts
A great deal of variance exists as to whether constitutions refer to political parties at all and, if so, what kinds of protections are provided. To some extent, this variance is a function of when a constitution was adopted: more recent constitutions tend to reference political parties, while older ones do not. Thus, fewer than 10% of the constitutions in force in 1875 mentioned parties, while over 80% of those in force in 2006 do so.
iii Similarly, before 1950 the right to form political parties was virtually non-existent; since then, this right has become much more common, with 60% of the constitutions in effect in 2000 guaranteeing such a right. iv These differences reflect transformations over time in the understanding of what the practice of democracy means in large societies.
The difference between the American and German constitutions is emblematic of this history. The oldest constitution, the American one, does not mention political parties at all; not only did the American Framers fail to anticipate the rise of modern political parties and their centrality to democracy, the American Constitution was actually conceived in hostility to parties. v Political parties were one quintessential form of the "factions" that James Madison, in defending the American constitutional design, decried. vi In trying to design a constitutional system that would preclude the rise of parties, the American Framers were simply reflecting a deeper, more longstanding tradition in Europe of "antipartyism" -the view that political parties, because they are sectarian and partisan, are divisive elements that corrode the capacity of democratic government to pursue the common good.
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In contrast, constitutions formed in the direct aftermath of 20 th century totalitarian regimes, or in the knowledge of how such regimes functioned, reflected awareness of the fact that one of the first things such regimes did was to eliminate party competition and consolidate one-party rule. Thus, the post-World War II German Constitution, in its well-known Art. 21
provision, provides express protection of the right to form political parties -while also requiring, in reaction to the Nazi era, that parties internally be structured along democratic lines:
Political parties participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and the use of their funds. Similarly, in the area of election financing, the German Court has been extraordinarily attentive to the possible partisan manipulation of financing regulations by dominant parties.
Indeed, the Court has essentially defined the rules that govern public funding of political parties.
In one striking venture into this area, the German Court in 1958 struck down provisions making donations to political parties tax deductible. xv The Court reasoned that since progressive taxation meant that income tax rates increased as income increased, such a system of financing disproportionately benefitted wealthy (and corporate) taxpayers. Thus, the Court concluded, because tax-deductible party contributions favored certain political parties -those wealthy donors were inclined to support -this policy violated the constitutional principle of equality of opportunity for political parties. In this line of cases, the Court suggested that in order to ensure effective competition and diminish special-interest influence, the government could provide public financing to parties. The Court was careful to stress that such financing could not increase existing de facto inequalities between parties.
When the German government began public financing, the laws distributed funds based on the proportion of parliamentary seats each party won. xvi Parties that did not win seats could not receive public financing, leading parties that had actively campaigned but lost to challenge these limitations. xvii The German Court struck these provisions down as unconstitutional infringements on the rights of minor parties: "It is inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity for [the legislature] to provide these funds only to parties already represented in parliament or to those which ... win seats in parliament." At the same time, the Court recognized that public reimbursement would encourage new parties and that the legislature could act against the formation of "splinter" parties by making reimbursement contingent upon a new party obtaining a certain percentage of votes.
After the Bundestag responded by imposing a 2% threshold, the Court struck this down as well, on the ground that it violated general equality principles and constitutional provisions mandating universal and equal suffrage. xviii As a matter of constitutional law, the Court then specified that any party capturing 0.5% of the vote "manifests its seriousness as an election campaign competitor" and should receive a portion of public funds. Later, in a separate case, the Court held that independent candidates were also eligible for public funding under certain circumstances. xix The German Court thus has been quite active in drawing the constitutional boundary between political parties and the state -a difficult task complicated by public financing. For many years, the Court struggled to distinguish between public funding designed to defray legitimate campaign costs and public funding designed for the general support of parties. Eventually the Court abandoned that distinction as unworkable and instead held that the total of state funding could not exceed the total amount the parties themselves raised. xx The
Court established this rule to ensure that the parties remained tied to their voters and did not become too entrenched. The Court has also attentively monitored tax deductions for party contributions and has banned tax deductions for corporate contributions to parties and for individual contributions so large that they raised concerns about equality between parties.
The Canadian Supreme Court has similarly invoked that country's constitution to protect the constitutional rights of regional or smaller political parties in the context of campaignfinance laws. In the important Figeuroa case, xxi the Canadian Supreme Court confronted election laws that required a political party to nominate candidates in at least 50 election districts in order to be an officially registered party. Among the benefits of registered party status at issue in the case were the right of registered parties to issue tax receipts for donations the parties received outside the official election period, the right of candidates to transfer unspent election funds to the party (rather than to the government), and the right of the party's candidates to list their party affiliation on the ballot. The purpose of these provisions, according to the government, was to ensure that only parties representing large coalitions, with some geographic breadth of appeal, would receive the benefits of party status. Thus, the provisions aimed to reduce the fragmentation and splintering of parties.
In a decision unanimous in outcome but split in reasoning, the Court held that these provisions violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada's constitutional text.
The majority applied more of an individual rights analysis and concluded that these provisions unjustifiably infringed upon a constitutional right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process; voters who supported smaller parties would be unduly burdened by the 50-district requirement for party status. A minority group of Justices was more willing to permit government to subordinate individual interests to various structural or systemic aims in the design of electoral institutions. Thus, this group of Justices thought electoral institutions could be designed for the aim of creating and sustaining more centrist, "accommodative" parties.
These Justices pointed to the Canadian Court's handling of gerrymandering claims, in which the Canadian Court had not applied a strict rule of population equality across all election districts, but had instead permitted government to design districts to overrepresent rural areas in order to create more of a sense of inclusion and fair representation. But even though this group of Justices was willing to permit government to treat major and minor parties differently for certain, justifiable ends of democracy itself -such as encouraging parties that represent a national perspective --these Justices nonetheless also concluded, as the majority did, that the 50-district requirement for party status was unconstitutional. In large provinces, a regional party could mount 50 candidacies, while parties in small provinces could not; thus, the law was not tailored to ensuring only broad, national parties and effectively did not treat different regions of Canada or different provinces equally -and for that reason, violated the Charter. Thus, for quite different reasons, both groups of Justices concluded that dominant political actors had used their power over election laws to diminish, unconstitutionally, the role of smaller parties.
B. Internal Parliamentary Rights of Minor Parties and Independent Officeholders
To ensure that dominant parties do not capture politics in yet other ways, the German Court has also been willing to review the internal distributions of policymaking influence within the legislature itself. In particular, the German Court has held that opposition parties have a participatory interest that the ruling coalition cannot suppress through parliamentary procedures. xxii For example, the constitution of one German state allowed one-fourth of the members of parliament to request a committee to investigate problems with government. In one instance, after a minority party had established an investigative committee, the majority party sought to add additional charges to the committee's mandate, including a counter-corruption charge against the leader of the minority party. The minority sued, and the Court upheld the minority's constitutional power to define the terms of its own investigation. In an insightful passage, which recognized that competition between parties was a main mechanism through which government could be held accountable, the Court noted:
The In other litigation, a member of the Bundestag (the German Parliament) who had first been elected as a representative of the Green Party resigned from that party and became an independent representative. He sued after he was stripped of all committee positions, and the Court held that a representative without a party affiliation could not be excluded from committees merely because he was not a member of any party (although he could be denied the right to vote in committee). xxiv As the Court put it, the "constitutional protection of parliamentary minorities -a right following from the principle of democracy -also applies to independent representatives." In general, the Court has taken the position that "parties must be represented on committees in proportion to their strength." xxv Finally, in a case not involving interparty competition, but one in which the Court was aware of the possibilities for partisan manipulation, the Court held that when a successful candidate on a party's list withdraws or resigns after election, the party cannot simply name a substitute, nor can it shift the order of the candidates on its list. To respect the preferences of voters, the candidate who is next in line on the list elected must be given the seat. xxvi This line of cases explores the structure of relationships between parties and their candidates, and between parties within the legislative process, and reveals the extent to which the German Court has taken an active role in protecting the political process from manipulation by partisan majorities.
C. Electoral Thresholds
A recurring constitutional issue across democracies that rest on proportional representation has been the constitutionality of various thresholds of representation. These thresholds have been challenged by minor parties as being inconsistent with constitutional commitments to democracy. Courts have responded by embracing the legitimacy of judicial oversight over these thresholds, rather than treating them as political choices to which courts should be highly deferential. On the merits, courts have sought to find a balance between the need for thresholds at some level -a response to the failed parliamentary systems between the wars, which were thought to be paralyzed in part because representation was highly fragmented among numerous parties, including small ones -and the fact that high thresholds could be a means by which dominant political parties suppress political challenge.
Thus, the German Court has rejected numerous challenges to that system's five-percent threshold by accepting a weighty governmental interest in effective governance institutions, which in that Court's view justified measures to avoid party splintering "which would make it more difficult or even impossible to form a majority." xxvii In similar fashion, the constitutional courts of the Czech Republic and Romania have upheld challenges to their systems' five-percent threshold for representation. xxviii At the same time, the German court struck down five-percent thresholds in the immediate aftermath of reunification, on the basis that such a threshold would suppress competition and representation from the former East Germany, in light of the lack of electoral experience and hence the ability to forge effective aggregate actors, such as parties, in the first steps of East Germany's transition to democracy. with wide enough popular support that made it at one time the largest single party in the Turkish parliament. Nonetheless, the Turkish Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the party, the surrender of its assets to the state, and the removal of four Refah members from Parliament, while also banning the party's leaders from elective office for five years. xxxvii The Court did so on the ground that the party was "antidemocratic" because it violated the Turkish constitutional commitment to a democratic and secular state. The Welfare Party case is noteworthy not only because the party was a major force in Turkey, not a fringe party, but also because the Welfare Party was able to appeal to a supranational human rights tribunal, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR).
xxxviii Thus, the case tested Europe-wide principles concerning the boundaries, if any, of political party participation in constitutional democracy. The ECHR upheld the decision of the Turkish courts on the ground that "a State cannot be required to wait, before intervening, until a political party has seized power and begun to take concrete steps to implement a policy incompatible with the standards of the Convention and democracy, even though the danger of that policy for democracy is sufficiently established and imminent." Thus, this line of cases across many countries, and their endorsement in the Turkish cases by the ECHR, reveals that the constitutional orders in many countries permit restraints on "extremist parties" that would clearly be unconstitutional within the First Amendment tradition of the United States. To some extent, that is not surprising; the United States has long tolerated extremist speech in general that other democracies proscribe. But it is one thing to regulate even the speech of an individual. The stakes are even higher when the issue becomes the constitutionality in democratic states of regulating, and even banning, entire political parties.
Party Rights to Autonomy?
Beyond the context of ensuring that minor parties continue to be able to put competitive pressure on major parties and the context of "extremist parties," constitutions and courts vary greatly as to whether parties should enjoy a broad, general constitutional right to autonomy. The
German system expressly rejects this view, in the sense that the German Constitution specifically regulates the internal structure and organization of parties; as a reflection of the Nazi experience, Art. 21 of the German Constitution requires that parties be internally organized to be democratic.
The German Court has taken this provision to mean that a political party "must be structured from the bottom up, that is, that the members must not be excluded from decision-making processes, and that the basic equality of members as well as freedom to join or to leave must be guaranteed." In all democratic systems, those who occupy political office will be tempted to use their temporary power to adopt rules that make it more difficult for their potential challengers to succeed. Because rival political parties are the most potent form through which such challenges are likely to be mobilized and organized, all democratic systems face the risk that those in power will seek to adopt rules that weaken rival parties. A central task for modern constitutionalism, therefore, is to seek to preserve and sustain ground rules of political competition that enable parties to compete for political power on fair and appropriate terms. The German Constitutional
Court has probably developed the leading jurisprudence thus far on these issues.
At the same time that parties are the principal carriers of democratic participation, they also can pose risks to the democratic system. Courts in many countries in different religious, geographical, and historical contexts have struggled with the issue of whether the constitutional order should permit states to ban, or otherwise restrict, political parties that are considered "extremist" and hence threatening to the maintenance of democracy itself. Precisely how to draw the boundary between protecting parties as vital sources of competition and constraining extreme parties as threats to democracy remains a profound and difficult question that bears future study, particularly as religiously-based parties appear to be on the march in many countries. The freedom of association includes the right to establish and join political associations and parties and, through them, to work jointly and democratically to give expression to the will of the people and to the organization of political power. The rights of a citizen include the right to form and join political parties, to take part in political campaigns, and to vote and to be a candidate in free and fair elections of members of the House of Representatives held by secret ballot and ultimately on the basis of equal suffrage.-Fiji 1998. Article 6.fE
Political parties or groups take part in the elections and the political, economic and social life. Creation, merger, incorporation, and dissolution of political parties is free, with due regard for national sovereignty, the democratic regime, multiplicity of political parties and fundamental human rights, observing the following precepts...
-Brazil 2005. Article 17
xii The material here and in the next few pages is drawn from Issacharoff & Pildes (1998 .
